essence, action and authority (oÙs…a, ™xous…a, ™nšrgeia) 2 . His indignation points to the direction of Post-Nicene discussions around the meaning of divine names. For instance, Athanasius of Alexandria in his On the Councils of Ariminum and Selucia (De Synodis) argued that the term ¢gšnnhtoj has two different but equally valid meanings (shmainÒmena): the first signifying "he who has no cause (tÕ m¾ oecon tÕn a ‡tion)", and the second signifying "he who is neither creation (po…hma), nor generation (kt…sma)" 3 . Expectedly enough, this affirmation provoked a set of logical and theological questions concerning the definition of tÕ shmainÒmenon, which Eunomius didn't hesitate to ask. Thus, in the First Apology, Eunomius censured people who: "stumble at the use of equivocal terms (ta‹j Ðmwnum…aij prospta…ontaj) and understand the essence to be one thing (›teron mn t¾n oÙs…an nooàntej) and the meaning of the word which designates it to be something else (›teron dš ti par' aÙt¾n tÕ shmainÒmenon)" 4 . This argument of Eunomius represents a typical example of a Peripatetic criticism of Stoic language theory. Ammonius, in his commentary On Aristotle On Interpretation, affirmed that nouns and verbs directly signify real objects and that "one should not invent anything in between thoughts and real objects (oÙdn ›teron de‹ par¦ taàta ™pinoe‹n mšson toà te no»matoj kaˆ toà pr£gmatoj)"; likewise the Stoics who invented the notion of lektÕn 5 .
The distinction between objects (tugc£nonta), things named or significata (pr£gmata, shmainÒmena, lekt£, noht£) , and words or signifiers formed the basis of Stoic linguistics. This distinction was adopted by Hellenic grammarians. Pursuing the discussion of the correctness of names, the Stoics reached a compromise solution of this problem 6 , which was also supported by the grammarians 7 . They believed that names are correctly (i.e. fÚsei) assigned (i.e. qšsei). They also taught that in the course of time the initial correctness of names, which basically attested an agreement of signifiers and significata, was blurred and such was the provenance of ambiguity and homonymy 8 . It was in conformity with the Stoic linguistics that grammarians believed in 2 Dyscolus, p. 91. the sequential provenance of parts of speech 9 , where nouns (personal names and appellatives), which signify substance, are succeeded by verbs signifying a certain state of substance 10 .
Origen generally supported the language theory of Hellenic grammarians. Although he only once referred to lekt£ in the Commentary on Psalms 11 , he rather frequently (more than 100 times) used the term shmainÒmenon to designate "significatum". For instance in the Commentary on John he advised a reader of Scripture to distinguish clearly between "the language (fwn¾), meaning (shmainÒmena), and things (pr£gmata), on which the meaning is based" 12 . In the Commentaries on Genesis, Origen argued for the sequential provenance of parts of speech 13 . He also supported the concept of the pristine language, which somewhat justified his idea of the divine origin of the Hebrew proto-language (viz. before the babble of languages in Gen 11). In such a way he affirmed that some of the Hebrew divine names (like Adonai and Sabaoth) help in the ascendance to God 14 .
Pondering on this evidence Jean Daniélou and John Dillon assumed that Origen's language theory could be affiliated with the voces magicae concept which emerged from the Chaldean Oracles and was held by the Neoplatonic theurgists 15 . In spite of these beliefs, which, as J. Dillon demonstrated, come really close to the views held by the Neo-Platonists, Origen emphatically renounced the equation of the pagan rituals to the Christian prayer. He underscored the different mechanisms of the pagan and Christian worship 16 . Whatever parallels might be seen between Origen's conjectures on the revelatory origin of the Hebrew proto-language and the concept of voces magicae (lately elaborated by Iamblichus in the De mysteriis with regard to the Greek Magical Papyri 17 ) the practical appliance of the divine names in prayer and reciting of spells, described by Origen and the Neo-Platonists, reveal an apparent difference of their language theories. In such a way Origen emphasised that Christian prayer stands as far away from the magical spell as the inane sounds from the meaningful words. In the treatise Against Celsus (Contra Celsum) Origen also asserted that magical spell reveals its weakness in translation, which renders it powerless, while the Christian prayer remains powerful as long as one who says the prayer does it consciously:
"for the Lord of all languages (Ð p£shj dialšktou kÚrioj) of the earth hears those who pray to Him in each different tongue, hearing, if I may so say, but one speech corresponding the meaning (aej m©j fwnÁj tÁj kat¦ t¦ shmainÒmena ¢koÚwn), expressing itself in different dialects" 18 .
Besides, from Origen's Biblical studies we learn that he had a sober scholarly approach to the common biblical nouns and to the divine names likewise. In the Commentary on John Origen encouraged the exegetes to investigate a contextual connotation (toà shmainomšnou t¾n dÚnamin) of a divine name (™k tÁj fwnÁj), since this name is meant not only figuratively but literally (oÙ tropikîj ¢ll¦ kur…wj) 19 . The usage of tÕ shmainÒmenon in these two fragments is in tune with the Stoic understanding of the "thing signified", which belongs to the intellectual reality and implies different connotations; however after actualization in a concrete grammatical context, it receives a literal meaning.
Despite of Origen's leaning towards the Stoic linguistics his language theory embraced different philosophical concepts and hence should not be exclusively affiliated to any of them. However, I believe that a linkage with the relatively independent teaching of grammarians is a crucial component of Origen's linguistic views. Given that the analytical techniques and relevant concepts of the grammarians emerged from their textual critique of the Homeric poems, it is simply natural that a closeness of professional interests (of Hellenic, Jewish and Christian exegetes) resulted in a similarity of their methods. Now, let us see how the Cappadocians made use of the language theories of the Hellenic grammarians and Origen in their polemics with the Eunomians. Origen, Basil and Gregory Nazianzen in conformity with grammatical theory argued that the essence of a subject can be fully expressed by a predicate. In the Homilies on Jeremiah Origen applied this idea to the scriptural names of Christ saying that though the nature of Christ constitutes a single subject (tÕ mn Øpoke…menon ›n ™stin), it is conceived of in many names (ta‹j d ™pino…aij t¦ poll¦ ÑnÒmata), which represent different aspects of his nature 20 . In a similar manner, Gregory Nazianzen in his third theological oration professed that:
"although in accordance with a distinction in our thoughts (™pino…aij tisˆ diairoumšnaij) we use distinct names (ÑnÒmata) and that whatever is properly (kur…wj) called by this name really is God; and whatever he is in his 18 To clarify this statement, Gregory explained the term "relation" in conformity with Hellenic philosophical tradition 23 . He affirmed that a mere idea of the Father still brings in the idea of the Son (Ð pat»r: suneis£xei tÕn uƒÒn) and this fact of the relative connection between the ideas produces no changes in either of them, or as Gregory puts it:
"will not make it of a different nature, according to common ideas and the force of these names (oÙk ¢llotrièsei, kat¦ t¦j koin¦j ™nno…aj kaˆ t¾n tîn kl»sewn toÚtwn dÚnamin)" 24 .
In order to understand precisely this relative mode of the Father-Son relationship we must establish a philosophical pattern of the relationship between essence and hypostasis. It was again Origen who introduced the term hypostasis in Christian theology 25 , while the Stoics instituted the notion in a philosophical context 26 . Posidonius (131-51 BCE) defined hypostasis as an actualized being which comes into existence to manifest the eternal essence and its individual qualities in real phenomena. According to a paraphrase of Arius Didymus (1 st century BCE-CE), Posidonius:
"said that the substance of the whole, i.e. matter (t¾n tîn Ólwn oÙs…an kaˆ Ûlhn) was without quality and without shape, in so far as in no way has it a form detached of its own (oÙdn ¢potetagmšnon ‡dion oecei scÁma), nor quality by itself either (oÙd poiÒthta kaq' aØt»n), but always is in some 21 Gregorius Nazianzenus, Oratio 29 (De Filio), 13, 15-20, ed. P. Gallay, SCh 250, Paris 1978, 204, transl. by This distinction between the oÙs…a and ØpÒstasij gave rise to a tricky problem that concerned the understanding of hypostasis as an actualization of essence in its qualities. Thus, hypostasis was considered as something that manifests essence and at the same time is different from it. The qualities were understood as the functional characteristics of essence. A detailed explanation of this vision of essence is preserved in Origen's Homily on Prayer:
"By qualities (poiÒthtaj) they mean distinctively like the actualities and the activities (t¦j ™nerge…aj kaˆ t¦j poi»seij) in which movements and relations of the essence have come to be (t¦j kin»seij kaˆ scšseij sumbšbhken)" 28 .
Interestingly enough this complex vision of the essence, which exists behind the real objects and actualizes itself in them, finds an echo in the sphere of logic and grammar. An informative account of this concept is preserved in Dexippus' fourth-century Commentary on Categories 29 . Dexippus stated that "(tÕ Øpoke…menon) «subject» has two senses, both with the Stoics and with the older philosophers (the Peripatetic and the Old Academy)" 30 . I have formalized his evidence in the following table:
1 st sense of subject (prîton Øpoke…menon):
qualityless matter (¹ ¥poioj Ûlh) = a subject of proposition = potential body (dun£mei sîma), e.g., it (t…) "one being the so-called primary subject (prîton Øpoke…menon), i.e. qualityless matter (¹ ¥poioj Ûlh), which Aristotle calls «potential body» (dun£mei sîma)" 31 . 2 nd sense of subject: qualified subject (Øpoke…menon tÕ poiÒn) = actualization (ØpÒstasij) of the subject in the qualities, which are predicated of the subject (relative terms prÒj ti lšgesqai), e.g., the bronze "and the second type of subject is the qualified subject (Øpoke…menon tÕ poiÒn)" 32 . general or individual qualities (koinîj À "d…wj) e.g., the bronze of statue (general), or the bronze of the statue of Socrates (particular) "these attributes are either general or individual (koinîj À "d…wj); for both the bronze and Socrates are subjects (Øpoke…menon) to those things that come to be in them (™gginomšnoij) or are predicated of them (kathgoroumšnoij). For «subject» is regarded as being a relative term (kat¦ prÒj ti lšgesqai) (for it is the subject of something -tinˆ g¦r Øpoke…menon), either without qualification, of those things that come to be in it and are predicated of it, or in a particular sense" 33 .
This concept of essence, which finds its actualization in the qualities of real things, fitted a complex Christian vision of the divine essence. Basil used this idea in his polemics with Eunomius and for a formulation of his Christological teaching. In the Letter 38, he professed:
"That which is spoken of in the specific sense (tÕ "d…wj legÒmenon) is signified by the word «hypostasis» (tù tÁj Øpost£sewj dhloàsqai •»mati). For, because of the indefiniteness of the term, he who says «man» has introduced through our hearing some vague idea, so that, although the nature is manifested by the name (t¾n mn fÚsin ™k toà ÑnÒmatoj delwqÁnai), that which subsists in the nature (tÕ d ØfestÕj) and is specifically designated by the name is not indicated (dhloÚmenon "d…wj ØpÕ toà ÑnÒmatoj pr©gma m¾ shmanqÁnai)… It is not the indefinite notion of essence (oÙc ¹ ¢Òristoj tÁj oÙs…aj oennoia) which creates no definite image because of the generality of its significance (™k tÁj koinÒthtoj toà shmainomšnou st£sin), but the hypostasis, which is evident through the specific qualities" 34 .
In conformity with Basil, Gregory Nazianzen also used the category of "relation" (scÁsij) in his formulation of Christological doctrine. In the second theological oration he affirmed:
"He [sc. Christ] is word, because he is related to the Father (oecei prÕj tÕn patšra) as word is to mind (prÕj noàn lÒgoj), not only because of the unpassionate character of his birth (di¦ tÕ ¢paqj tÁj genn»sewj), but also because of the conjunction and conveying peculiar to this relationship (¢ll¦ kaˆ tÕ sunafšj, kaˆ tÕ ™xaggeltikÒn). One could say too, perhaps, that his relationship is that of definition to term defined (Óroj prÕj tÕ ÐrizÒmenon), since «word» has the meaning in Greek of «definition» (toàto lšgetai lÒgoj)" 35 . 33 Ibidem. 34 Basilius Caesariensis, Epistula 38, 3, 1, PG 32, 328, transl. by B. Jackson, NPNF Ser. II, vol. 8, ed. Ph. Schaff -H. Wace, New York 1895, 137. 35 Gregorius Nazianzenus, Oratio 30 (De Filio), 20, SCh 250, 266-268, transl. by Wickham -Williams, p. 179. Now, having examined the logical and grammatical aspects of the argumentation of Origen, Basil and Gregory, let us return to the questions we posed at the beginning of this article and try to speculate on the answers which they might have given to them. How much does thought depend on the language which formulates it? From the evidence we have assembled above, it is apparent that Origen, Basil and Gregory supported the linguistic theories of the Hellenic grammarians, who believed in a direct and fundamental connection between language and thought. Ergo, the logical and grammatical rules of the correct formulation of thought likewise regulate the mental procedures.
A backbone of Apollonius' syntaxis constituted an idea that regular organization (katallhlÒthj) of the significata (noht£) is reflected in regularity of the signifiers (sc. fwna…, words) 36 . It is notable that a derivate of a rather rare terminus technicus katallhlÒthj (kat£llhloj) is quite as frequent in Origen's opera as in Apollonius. A belief in the orderly organization of the universe also formed a foundation of Origen's systematic theology. In the Commentary on John Origen affirmed that the whole Bible is one body, whose parts form a harmonious unity that is the word of God, which "consists of many ideas each of which is a part of the whole word" 37 . Gregory Nazianzen articulated even more clearly the concept of the fundamental orderly organization of the universe, which is mirrored in the systematic organization of knowledge. In his Oration 32 38 he declared that:
"there is an order in elements (T£xij ™n stoice…oij), which constitute the bodies (™x ïn t¦ sèmata)… It was order, then, that assembled the whole (T£xij oân tÕ p©n sunest»sato). It is order that holds together the things of heaven and the things of earth; order among the things we perceive with our minds (t£xij ™n nohto‹j: t£xij ™n a"sqhto‹j); order among those we perceive with our senses" 39 . It should not be overlooked however that the system or order which Origen and Gregory were talking about was a paradoxical one and this distinguished it from the syllogistic teaching of Eunomius. An axiomatic belief in the incomprehensibility of the divine essence rendered the logical and grammatical theological arguments of Origen and the Cappadocians as legitimate as one can expect to draw from the systematic philological analysis of the text. Thus, I would imagine that their response to our last question: How to think and speak of incomprehensible God and How to make sure that theological discourse refers to an ontological reality and does not just manifest the idea of deity inherent in the human mind? -might address a principal distinction between comprehensible and incomprehensible knowledge. According to Origen and the Cappadocians, comprehensible knowledge about God that one can extract from a philological analysis of the text of the Bible and incomprehensible knowledge about God cannot be rendered in words. Peculiarly consonant with Ludwig Wittgenstein's famous motto (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 7): "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent" 40 , Gregory in his second theological oration stated that: "Since the divine essence is ineffable, we too will honour it by silence (™peˆ d ¥rrhta Ãn, kaˆ ¹m‹n siwpÍ tim£sqw)" 41 .
(Summary)
The article outlines the philosophical and linguistic background of the Post-Nicene theological debates concerning the relationship between the Father and the Son. A sharp focus dwells of the provenance of the term hypostasis, the philosophical and grammatical understanding of the terms hypokeimenon and ousia and the Stoic definition of the signifier and thing signified. The article shows new aspects of the anti-Eunomian polemics of the Cappadocian fathers, which come into sight due to comparison of theological concepts with Hellenic linguistic and grammatical theories. In such a way, the comparison demonstrates methodological and technical strand of the theological argumentation of the Cappadocian fathers and their affinity for the exegetic methodology of Origen.
GRAMATYKA TEOLOGII: LOGICZNA ARGUMENTACJA OD ORYGENESA DO OJCÓW KAPADOCKICH (Streszczenie) W artykule przedstawiono filozoficzne i językowe tło ponicejskich debat teologicznych dotyczących relacji między Ojcem i Synem. Starano się zwłaszcza uwypuklić następujące zagadnienia: pochodzenie terminu hipostaza, filozoficzne i gramatyczne rozumienie określeń hypokeimenon i ousia oraz stoickie definicje: "element oznaczający" i "rzecz oznaczana". W artykule przedstawiono nowe aspekty antyeunomiańskiej polemiki Ojców Kapadockich, które wynikają na skutek porównania pojęć teologicznych z greckimi teoriami językowymi i gramatycznymi. Takie porównanie ukazuje metodologiczny i techniczny aspekt argumentacji teologicznej Ojców Kapadockich, a także ich bliskość z metodologią egzegetyczną Orygenesa. 40 L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, with an introduction by B. Russel, New York 1922, 90. 41 Gregorius Nazianzenus, Oratio 28 (De theologia), 20, SCh 250, 140, transl. by Wickham -Williams, p. 122.
